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RECENT DECISIONS
COURTS -MISCONDUCT OF COUNSEL IN DIVORCE
ACTION CONSTITUTED REVERSABLE ERROR
At trial on an issue of adultery, husband's counsel testified
and referred repeatedly in summation to his presence at an
evidence-producing raid, offered affidavit containing hearsay, and
presented prejudicial facts to the jury in a question to which
objection was sustained. Trial court entered interlocutory divorce
decree on jury verdict for husband. Held (3-2): Reversed for new
trial. Weil v. Weil, 283 App. Div. 33, 125 N. Y. S. 2d. 368 (1st
Dep't 1953).
New York courts generally consider the following types of
misconduct of counsel as grounds for reversal:
1. Improper and prejudicial questions: Cosselmon v. Dunfee,
172 N. Y. 507, 65 N. E. 494 (1902). (Counsel asked witness: "Do
you know whether they carry insurance for accident to their employees?"); Nicholas v. Rosenthal, 283 App. Div. 9, 126 N. Y. S.
2d. 34 (1st Dep't 1953). (Questioning of witness who had not seen
accident created impression that witness was withholding evidence).
2. Inflammatory summation: Price v. Mullen, 247 App. Div.
532, 288 N. Y. Supp. 828 (4th Dep't 1936). (Counsel called hostile
witness "a crook."); Walter v. Joline, 136 App. Div. 426, 120
N. Y. Supp. 1025 (1st Dep't 1910). (Referred to absence of old
witnesses at new trial).
3. Offer of evidence counsel knows is inadmissible: Nicholas
v. Rosenthal, supra. (Offer of hearsay statement to create impression that jury was kept from seeing it by a legal technicality).
In many cases more than one prejudicial act is involved; in
the instant case all of the above types of misconduct were present.
Courts are prone to reverse for such tactics upon a finding of
"bad faith" on the part of offending counsel; i. e., where the
injection of misconduct appears deliberate, especially where it
continues after warning. Halpern v. Nassau El. R. Co., 16 App.
Div. 90, 45 N. Y. Supp. 134 (2d Dep't 1897). But see Hoffman v.
New York, 84 Misc. 637, 653, 147 N. Y. Supp. 900, 909 (N. Y. City
Ct. 1914), where the court found that references to extraneous
matters were made in "palpably bad faith," but before setting
aside the verdict, noted: " ...

[C]ounsel ...

is a young man

whom I hold in high regard and do not believe would be delib.
erately guilty of a violation of . . . professional standards

(84 Misc. at 656, 147 N. Y. Supp. at 911).

. .
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In the instant case the court did not specifically discuss
counsel's motivation, but contended itself with a recital of the
misconduct and concluded that under the circumstances a fair
trial was impossible. The dissent noted that since counsel's allegedly inflammatory summation may have been provoked by
statements made by opposing counsel, bad faith was not evident.
But it has been held that provocation does not excuse or justify
such misconduct. Harris v. Eakins, 201 App. Div. 257, 194 N. Y.
Supp. 187 (1922).
Failure to interpose timely objections to misconduct at the
trial may result in the courts' refusal to intervene. Bennet v.
Town of Wheeler, 209 App. Div. 283, 204 N. Y. Supp. 695 (4th
Dep't 1924). Refusal to reverse in the above case was based in
part on the fact that no exception was taken during argument,
but only after the jury had retired. Also, in Freeman v. Zirger,
125 Misc. 288, 210 N. Y. Supp. 715 (N. Y. City Ct. 1925), after
an inflammatory summation by defendant's counsel, and a jury
verdict for defendant following seven minutes' deliberation, the
court held that where plaintiff failed to object, move for mistrial,
or for withdrawal of a juror, trial court could not disturb the
verdict. But in New York Cent. R. R. Co. v. Johnson, 279 U. S.
310 (1929), the Supreme Court held that a court on its own
motion may reverse on grounds of public interest in a fair trial.
This appears to be the general rule in New York. Cosselinon v.
Dunfee, supra; Nicholas v. Rosenthal, supra.
In the instant case objection to an improper question was
promptly sustained, but apparently the damage was irretrievable.
No motion for mistrial appears to have been made. Objection to
the summation was interposed only after the jury had returned
with an unfavorable verdict. The dissent suggest that this was
tardy. (283 App. Div. at 39, 125 N. Y. S. 2d at 373).
In a "close case," i. e., one in which the court concedes that
a jury verdict for either party would be sustained by the evidence,
it is difficult to show actual prejudice in the verdict; the probability that the jury was influenced is sufficient to warrant reversal.
Tassello v. Adley Express Co., 158 Misc. 836, 286 N. Y. Supp.
770 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
But where the verdict is clearly supported by the evidence,
courts have refused to intervene. In Bennet v. Town of Wheeler,
supra, where the trial court on its own motion warned the jury
against any play to its emotions, the jury deliberated five hours,
and ". . . evidently dealt with the case rationally . . .," the
court could find no reason, ". . . aside from making an example
in terrorem . . ." (209 App. Div. at 285, 204 N. Y. Supp. at 697),
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to reverse. But a strong dissent argued that the court could not
assume the jury was not influenced, and urged a new trial because
the remarks were calculated to prejudice the jury, ". . . and that
is the single and sufficient reason for granting a new trial . .
(209 App. Div. at 286, 204 N. Y. Supp. at 697).
In the instant case the appellate court expressly conceded
that the jury verdict was adequately supported by the evidence
(283 App. Div. at 37, 125 N. Y. S. 2d at 372). The decision appears, therefore, to represent a recognition of the particularly
delicate nature of a divorce action, and indicates the propensity
of the courts to utilize the power of reversal for a new trial on
the ostensible grounds of prejudice as a disciplinary weapon
against counsel. While such decisions are defensible on ethical
grounds, they may have the practical effect of punishing an
innocent litigant for the offenses of counsel.
Morton Mendelsohn
CRIMINAL LAW -PERJURY CONVICTION UPHIELD
DESPITE GRAND JURY MISCONDUCT
LEADING TO INDICTMENT
Defendant, indicted for perjury as a result of statements
made before a federal grand jury investigating espionage activities, appealed his subsequent conviction alleging irregularities in
the grand jury proceedings and an improper charge to the jury.
The conviction was reversed and remanded on the latter grounds.
191 F. 2d 246 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U. S. 907 (1952).
Instead of proceeding on the original indictment, the government
returned a new indictment based on perjured testimony at the
first trial. Defendant, again convicted, urges that perjurious
statements made at a trial under an illegally procurred indictment cannot be subsequently prosecuted. Held (2-1): Assuming
without deciding that the first indictment was bad because of
government misconduct, the court had jurisdiction over the crime
and the person and the defendant could not lie with impunity.
U. S. v. Remington, 208 F. 2d 567 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 74
Sup. Ct. 476 (1954).
The subsequent quashing of an indictment for failure to state
an offense does not immunize a defendant from prosecution for
perjury in the defense of that indictment as long as the court had
jurisdiction over the alleged crime and the person. U. S. v. Williams, 341 U. S. 58 (1951). The majority admitted that the instant
case was distinguishable because of the allegation of government
-misconduct but found no difficulty in extending the Williams doctrine in as much as the defendant had chosen to lie rather than
attack the indictment for illegality.

